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Abstract
A series of papers in Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities in Medicine (PEHM) have recently disputed
whether non-heart beating organ donors are alive and whether non-heart beating organ donation
(NHBD) contravenes the dead donor rule. Several authors who argue that NHBD involves
harvesting organs from live patients appeal to "strong irreversibility" (death beyond the reach of
resuscitative efforts to restore life) as a necessary criterion that patients must meet before
physicians can declare them to be dead. Sam Shemie, who defends our current practice of NHBD,
holds that in fact physicians consider patients to be dead or not according to physician intention to
resuscitate or not.
We suggest that criteria for a concept are not necessarily truth conditions for assertions involving
the concept. Hence, non-heart beating donors may be declared dead without meeting the criterion
of strong irreversibility even though strong irreversibility is implied by the concept of death. Our
perception that a concept applies in a given case is determined not by the concept itself but by our
necessary skill and judgment when using it. In the case of deciding that a patient is dead, such
judgment is learned by physicians as they learn the practice of medicine and may vary according to
circumstances. Current practice of NHBD can therefore be defended without abandoning death as
an empirical concept, as Shemie appears to do. We conclude that the dead donor rule continues
to be viable and ought to be retained so as to guarantee what the public most cares about as
regards organ donation: that physicians can be trusted to make determinations of eligibility for
organ donation in the interests of patients and not for other purposes such as increasing the
availability of organs.
Editorial
Physicians and ethicists are once again debating defini-
tions of death. The practice of non-heart beating organ
donation (NHBD) appears to many to violate the dead
donor rule, which requires that death precede organ dona-
tion and that living patients not be killed for organ pro-
curement [1]. Controlled NHBD involves withdrawing
support for brain-injured patients in the operating room
Published: 4 February 2008
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:5 doi:10.1186/1747-5341-3-5
Received: 29 January 2008
Accepted: 4 February 2008
This article is available from: http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/5
© 2008 Huddle et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:5 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/5
Page 2 of 5
(page number not for citation purposes)
and harvesting their organs shortly after cardiopulmonary
arrest. The interval between arrest and a declaration of
death is as short as two minutes in Pittsburgh, where
NHBD was developed in 1992 [2], or as long as five to ten
minutes in most of Europe. It has been argued that such
patients do not meet valid criteria for death shortly after
cardiopulmonary arrest and that controlled NHBD there-
fore amounts to harvesting organs from live patients.
Complicating the discussion are increasing misgivings
about the concept of brain death. While that concept has
been generally accepted as a clinically useful tool since its
introduction by the ad hoc Harvard Committee to exam-
ine the definition of brain death [3], a growing body of
knowledge about severely-brain injured patients has chal-
lenged its coherence. Philosophical justifications of a
brain death criterion for death have relied upon a notion
of life involving an essential integration of bodily func-
tions provided by the brain, the absence of which is death.
Studies of brain dead patients, some of whom have been
kept "alive" for long periods, suggest that in fact the brain
is not essential to many aspects of organismal integration
and that bodily integration may not be best thought of as
localized to a particular organ [4]. If this is so, the notion
of brain-mediated bodily integration does not offer a rea-
son to suppose that brain dead patients are really dead.
Another layer of complexity has been added by a growing
awareness of multiple points at which a patient might
plausibly be declared dead. Shewmon explicates such
points relevant to both heart and brain definitions of
death (table 1).
In recent months Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in
Medicine (PEHM) has hosted a lively discussion of
whether NHBD patients are really dead before organ
donation and of the implications of NHBD for the dead
donor rule and definitions of death. Joseph Verheijde and
colleagues contend that patients subjected to NHBD are
dying rather than dead at the time of donation. Calling
such patients "dead" amounts to a manipulation of the
definition of death for purposes of furthering organ dona-
tion. Facing burgeoning technology, pluralistic societies
must respect patient autonomy as well as religious, cul-
tural and ethnic diversity and encourage public debate
about organ donation and about when death should be
declared. All adults would then be able to explicitly give or
withhold consent to donation [5,6]. This position is sec-
onded by David Wainwright Evans, who questions the
validity of "brain death" and agrees that NHBD patients
are dying rather than dead [7]. Michael Potts agrees but
draws the conclusion that NHBD should be forbidden as
it involves physicians in killing patients [8]. Sam Shemie
defends current practice, arguing that there has never been
an isolable line between life and death and that in current
medical practice death is determined not only by the state
of the organism but by physician intentions to resuscitate
or not. That being the case, two minutes of cardiac arrest
in the absence of resuscitative efforts is sufficient to
declare a patient dead before organ donation [9]. Ari R.
Joffe notes difficulties with the concept of brain death and
contends that we must consider patients dead only after
irreversible cardiopulmonary arrest. He faults Shemie for
favoring "weak" irreversibility (irreversibility because of
physician intention not to resuscitate) as the relevant cri-
terion for death because that standard would have us labe-
ling patients in identical physiological states as dead or
not dead yet according to context. Only "strong" irrevers-
ibility–cardiopulmonary arrest or brain death beyond the
reach of resuscitative efforts to restore circulation, breath-
ing, or brain function (E4 or E7 in table 1)–can be the
proper criterion for death. NHBD protocols are thus har-
vesting organs from patients who are not dead–this must
be acknowledged and publicly debated [10]. Finally Bel-
lomo and Zemperetti regard a continued dependence
upon a cardiopulmonary criterion for death as essential
for societal acceptance of organ donation, although they
regard any such criterion as an arbitrarily drawn line
across the death process–since "hypertechnological medi-
cine" has left us without an objectively identifiable border
between life and death [11].
For many, non-heart-beating organ donation has sharp-
ened a dilemma that we must face in using any concept.
Our concepts must be either descriptive or evaluative.
Either we observe death and only then declare its pres-
ence; or we construct death, as it were, by declaring it
according to our purposes in doing so. In the eyes of many
the practice of NHBD has moved us into the latter pos-
ture, as we appear to be harvesting organs from patients
who are dead more by stipulation than by empirical con-
firmation. The concept of death must either remain
descriptive or be recognized as unequivocally evaluative.
We must acknowledge that NHBD involves taking organs
from the living if our concept of death is to remain
descriptive. If, on the other hand, we are willing to give up
death as an empirical concept we can retain NHBD and
the dead donor rule by changing the definition of death so
that NHBD falls on the far side of the line between life and




E3 Loss of potential for cardiac autoresuscitation
E4 Loss of potential for interventional resuscitation
E5 Onset of permanent loss of consciousness
E6 Loss of potential for recovery of consciousness
E7 Irreversible loss of all brain function
Adapted from DA Shewmon, The dead donor rule: lessons from 
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The former option is probably the more attractive to most
physicians, trained as they are in a scientific tradition
according to which empirical concepts must be rigidly
applied. As Bernat states, life and death are non-overlap-
ping, dichotomous, and jointly exhaustive states [13];
death is therefore an event, not a process; and if medical
progress successfully teases out previously invisible points
at the boundary between life and death then one such
point will best fit the conceptual line that must continue
to divide the two states. If non-heart-beating donors fall
on the near side of that line, then we must accept that they
are not yet dead at the time of organ donation. Hence
Truog's proposal that we permit organ donation before
death given informed consent and adequate safeguards
against abuse [14]. The alternative, changing our concept
of death to reconcile the practice of NHBD with our con-
viction that we must not take organs from patients before
they are dead, seems an arbitrary gerrymandering of what
ought to remain an empirical concept.
We would contend, however, that our concepts do not
divide neatly between the fixed empirical and the consen-
sual evaluative; that the dilemma, in fact, is illusory. Any
intelligible concept must be governed by impersonal pub-
lic standards. But empirical concepts can evolve or change
without necessarily succumbing to unacceptable subjec-
tivity. Indeed, they must do so if they are to keep up with
changes in our practices or changes in our knowledge of
the world. This is to say, contra Bernat, that our empirical
concepts are necessarily "open" rather than fixed and
immutable [15]. New discoveries or practices can alter
them–a common enough phenomenon in the history of
science. A better view of points near the transition from
life to death afforded by contemporary medical practice
does not necessarily mandate choice of one such point as
the "real" boundary between the two states. If we have
previously regarded points ranging from E1 to E7 as the
relevant boundary, our concepts are potentially compati-
ble with any of them, or, perhaps, with all of them
depending upon context [16].
While our empirical concepts may be "open," our concept
of death certainly retains the notion of "strong" irreversi-
bility. Nothing in recent medical practice has altered our
continued conviction that death is not reversible by med-
ical means. But we still may not have to choose between
declaring non-heart-beating donors alive and gerryman-
dering the concept of death. Those who suppose other-
wise cite the hitherto unobserved points along the
trajectory from life to death brought within our view by
contemporary medical practice. Bringing our concept of
death to bear upon this newly visible part of that trajec-
tory, they conclude that the boundary between life and
death must fall at a point beyond which our most potent
technology can no longer achieve continued life–so that
"strong" irreversibility is required before a patient may be
declared dead. This is to confuse aspects of the concept of
death, which certainly include "strong" irreversibility,
with the kind of evidence we require in given situations to
conclude that a patient is dead, which may vary; to con-
fuse aspects of a concept with fixing its extension.
Wittgenstein and his interpreters argue persuasively that
criteria for a concept do not always determine our view of
when a given possible instance falls under it. Criteria are
sometimes truth conditions for assertions and sometimes
not [17,18]. In the case of the concepts of life and death,
this is confirmed when we consider the death of patients
in the hospital with and without do-not-resuscitate orders
on the chart. Patients in the hospital for whom do-not-
resuscitate (DNR) orders are written, should they die as
inpatients, do so in the traditional way–their death is
marked by the visible cessation of respiration, more or less
coincident with cardiac arrest. They are pronounced dead
by physicians shortly thereafter, often surrounded by fam-
ily and friends as might happen at home. Patients without
DNR orders who stop breathing in the hospital are
regarded differently; they are not dead, or, at least, not
dead yet. After twenty minutes or more of vigorous resus-
citative efforts they will be pronounced dead if they do not
respond; or, perhaps, their circulation and ventilation
restored with more or less aid from pressors and mechan-
ical ventilation, they will still be alive. Is it the case then
that patients with and without DNR orders, who may be
in physiologically similar states shortly after respiratory or
cardiac arrest, are arbitrarily regarded as dead or not
according to physician intention to resuscitate or not? No;
a physician declares the patient with DNR orders to be
dead shortly after cardiopulmonary arrest because she
most likely is, in fact, dead. Most resuscitative efforts are
unsuccessful, suggesting that most patients in fact meet
the criterion of strong irreversibility very soon after cardi-
orespiratory arrest. As to the patient without DNR orders
who arrests, physicians suspend judgment as to life or
death until resuscitative efforts have either succeeded or
failed–if they succeed, the patient has, of course, not died.
If they fail, we say that the patient died at some indetermi-
nate point between cardiac arrest and the cessation of
resuscitation.
We make a diagnosis of death shortly after cardiorespira-
tory arrest in the DNR patient not because we can make
the diagnosis with absolute certainty within five minutes
thereafter, but because we are willing to tolerate some
diagnostic imprecision in the context of a passage from
life to death that we have determined not to interrupt. In
the case of the patient without DNR orders who dies unex-
pectedly, we apply a more rigorous test by withholding a
declaration of death until resuscitative efforts have failed.
We do so having judged that in such cases, a relativelyPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:5 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/5
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favorable prognosis warrants the attempt at reversing the
arrest that we then make with our resuscitative efforts.
This variable readiness to make use of a clinical category
is of a piece with our usual practice in medicine. We make
diagnoses and label patients more or less readily depend-
ing upon the implications of diagnostic error and upon
the consequences for treatment and prognosis conferred
by the diagnosis. The degree of certainty we may require
for a given classificatory act will vary according to what we
will do when a diagnosis is made.
How much certainty ought we to require before we con-
sider the non-heart-beating organ donor to be dead? We
would contend that requiring absolute certainty that a
donor cannot be resuscitated before declaring death is not
warranted by the clinical context of NHBD. We confirm
the death of organ donors prior to donation to protect
their interests, and, secondarily, to maintain public trust
in organ donation. Just as in the case of the DNR patient,
we have determined not to interrupt the organ donor's
passage from life to death when we withdraw ventilatory
support. Within a few minutes after cardiorespiratory
arrest the donor is almost certainly dead; there is no prac-
tical reason for us to delay a determination of death as we
might for a patient whose more favorable prognosis war-
ranted vigorous resuscitation.
We would thus conclude, with Shemie, that NHBD does
not violate the dead donor rule. Contra Shemie, however,
death remains an empirical concept and is independent of
physician intention. Life and death are dichotomous
states, although the boundary between them may be hazy
given current medical practices. In spite of that haziness,
determinations of death are not arbitrary; they are more or
less precise determinations of an organism's state based
upon valid concepts skillfully deployed by physicians in
the interests of patients. Physicians necessarily exercise
judgment in diagnosing death and such judgment may
vary systematically in differing clinical contexts. If we pre-
sume that the ability to recognize instances of a concept is
tightly bound to the aspects of that concept–so that we
become a vehicle, as it were, of the concept of death as we
categorize patients as dead or not–such variance may
make us acutely uncomfortable. This presumption, we
suggest, is why an intensivist unprepared to recognize
death in salvageable patients in the intensive care unit
after two minutes of cardiorespiratory arrest might believe
herself constrained not to recognize it after two minutes of
arrest in any patient.
But the ability to recognize death is not a simple function
of our linguistic capacity in the form of our possession of
the concept of death. Our practice confirms that practical
"know how" or judgment must supplement our concepts
as we connect these to the world without. While two min-
utes of arrest is often too short a time for the intensivist to
conclude herself to be in death's presence, it is a long time
indeed to the internist or palliative care physician stand-
ing by the bedside after a patient's final agonal breath;
quite long enough to conclude that the patient is dead,
even if the formal declaration of death is delayed for a few
minutes more. Acknowledging such variance in our classi-
fying practices is to recognize the way in which we actually
use empirical concepts such as death; and it allows us to
reconcile NHBD with the dead donor rule.
That rule has played an important role in assuring the
public that physicians will protect the interests of patients
while practicing organ transplantation. Its opponents sug-
gest that the public might be educated to do without a rule
which relies on an equivocal concept–as our contextually
variable declarations of death imply that in fact multiple
concepts of death are in use, no one of which can claim
priority. Such a malleable notion of death cannot then do
the work required of it in regulating practices such as
when to bury, transfer an estate, commence an autopsy, or
harvest organs. Justifications other than death must be
found for our various end-of-life practices [19]. In the
United States this position has been bolstered by surveys
indicating that the American public has a hazy under-
standing of when severely brain-injured patients are
legally dead [20]. The same surveys show that under some
circumstances, a proportion of the public would support
pre-mortem organ donation.
If we are correct, this argument against the dead donor
rule is mistaken at its core, confusing concepts and their
aspects with the recognition of what falls under them. A
univocal and empirical concept of death is perfectly com-
patible with contextual variability in its use; death may
thus continue to serve as the conceptual regulator of our
end-of-life practices. That the public is confused is indeed
a reason to undertake public education about death and
organ donation. But if the public is to continue to trust
physicians, we must not extend the practice of organ
donation from the dead to the living. Thus we question
certain refinements of NHBD currently being introduced,
such as the use of extracorporeal membrane oxygenation
(ECMO) for organ donors before support is withdrawn.
When ECMO is used in NHBD, organ donors are never
without circulation and oxygenation before organ har-
vesting; thus organ procurement takes place without
death having occurred on any plausible understanding of
the concept. The gain of ECMO is better preservation of
organs harvested with its use–at the price of placing phy-
sicians in the position of killing patients while procuring
their organs. While such killing may not alter the terminus
of the organ donor's trajectory, which is death in any case,
the agency of physicians in the donor's death is morally
problematic; it is also an important step down what mightPublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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prove to be a very slippery slope. We suggest that the use
of ECMO transforms NHBD into "an ignoble form of can-
nibalism," as Renee Fox wrote of NHBD in its early days
[21]. Because we physicians must continue to do no harm,
we must forego the advantages of ECMO in NHBD and
continue to harvest organs only from patients who have
died. But we can continue to make that determination
according to clinical context.
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